How Sweden's food preparedness can be strengthened

How can Sweden secure access to food during crises and other serious disruptions? A new study from the Swedish Defence University and Lund University shows that emergency stockpiles or increased self-sufficiency are not enough. Strengthening food preparedness also requires public authorities, businesses and other actors to share a common understanding of the challenges, coordinate their objectives, and allocate costs and responsibilities.

Food supply has once again become a key preparedness issue in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequences of climate change have highlighted the vulnerability of today’s supply chains.

At the same time, Sweden’s food system today differs from the one that existed during the Cold War. Much of the system is operated by private actors, and food supply depends on international trade and complex supply chains.

In a new scientific study, researchers at the Swedish Defence University and Lund University have examined what is needed to strengthen food preparedness in such a system.

“Preparedness cannot be something we simply bring out when a crisis is approaching. It needs to be built into the way the food system operates every day. This requires both a shared understanding of the risks and better coordination among the many actors that collectively ensure the food supply”, says Per Becker, Professor at the Swedish Defence University.

Seven practices for better preparedness

In the study, the researchers present a theoretical framework comprising seven practices for strengthening food supply. The practices are divided into three areas.

The first concerns how actors understand risks and the complexity of the food system. The second concerns relationships between actors, including the need to coordinate time horizons and objectives and to create greater transparency in communication and decision-making.

The third area concerns how resources, costs and responsibilities are allocated. This includes distributing the costs of preparedness across the food supply chain, striking a balance between domestic production and secure international trade, and strengthening existing capacity.

One conclusion is that the three areas are interdependent.

“Political debate often focuses on concrete measures, such as stockpiling or increasing domestic production. But it is difficult for such measures to work effectively together unless the actors first have a shared understanding of the risks and are able to coordinate their objectives and time horizons”, says Per Becker.

The market cannot create preparedness on its own

The study also points to a fundamental problem: individual businesses have weak economic incentives to invest in preparedness measures that benefit society as a whole.

The researchers therefore describe the challenge as both a market and a governance problem. The market does not fully capture the societal value of preparedness, while responsibility and decision-making are distributed among numerous actors and policy areas.

At the same time, the findings show that private companies can have a considerable capacity to adapt rapidly once a crisis occurs.

“There is a great deal of capacity and adaptability in the existing system. The problem is that businesses do not always have incentives to bear the cost of preparedness in advance. We therefore need to find ways for government and industry to build resilience together, with the costs distributed in a reasonable manner”, says Per Becker.

Interviews with actors across the food system

The study is based on 30 interviews with 31 people conducted in February and March 2025. Participants included representatives of public authorities at various levels, primary producers, food companies, suppliers, industry organisations, academia and voluntary organisations.

Based on the interviews, the researchers identified nine overarching themes. These include legal and administrative barriers to decision-making, dependence on global trade and supply chains operating with limited buffers, and the economic conditions facing primary producers.

The findings point to several areas that need to be prioritised. For example, preparedness needs to be better integrated across different policy areas and levels of government. Public and private governance need to be combined, for example through minimum resilience requirements, public–private stockpiling arrangements and economic models for sharing costs.

The researchers also highlight the need to strike a balance between domestic production and international trade. Sweden needs to maintain its own production and processing capacity while ensuring that important international supply chains are robust.

“The aim cannot be for Sweden to produce everything itself, but nor can we assume that global trade will always function as normal. We need both viable production in Sweden and secure trading relationships with countries we can rely on even when the international security environment deteriorates”, says Per Becker.

Can be used as a checklist

The framework was developed on the basis of Swedish conditions, but the researchers argue that it may also be relevant to other high-income countries with privatised and fragmented food systems.

For public authorities, businesses and industry organisations, the framework can also be used to analyse their own preparedness.

“An important question is whether we are concentrating on the visible measures while overlooking the conditions required for them to work. The framework can be used as a checklist to examine whether we understand the risks in the same way, whether we are able to coordinate our efforts, and whether responsibilities and costs are reasonably distributed”, says Per Becker.