Varying commitments: Explaining variations in the use of force in multinational peace enforcement operations

Despite operating under robust mandates and rules of engagement, national military contributions to multinational peace enforcement operations often vary widely in their willingness to use force and take risks. This PhD project explores why some combat-capable contingents adopt caveats, while others do not, within the same mission. By comparing national contingents within NATO’s Bosnia force (IFOR/SFOR) and the African Union’s mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as well as between both missions, the research sheds light on what drives these differences in commitment and operational behavior.

Multinational military operations (MMOs) with peace enforcement mandates authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter typically operate with robust rules of engagement (RoE) permitting troops to carry out offensive military operations to protect civilians, enforce compliance with existing peace agreements, and create stable environments favourable to state-building and civilian resettlement. These missions differ from traditional peacekeeping operations which operate on the basis of consent from all conflict parties, limited use of force only in self-defence, and ceasefire/peace agreement monitoring.

State participation in MMOs is voluntary, whether in operations undertaken by the UN, or regional organisations like the EU, AU, or NATO, as well as those carried out by international coalitions-of-the-willing. As such, given the permissive standards in the use of force in peace enforcement operations, how can we explain the prevalence of national reservations on the use of force – caveats – by sizeable non-token troop contingents composing of combat arms units in these missions? More so, what explains variation in the adoption of caveats amongst national contingents consisting of similar (non-token) numbers and combat arms units in robust peace enforcement operations?

TCCs making non-token, combat-capable contributions to peace enforcement operations are perceived as best placed to implement mission mandates based on their material capability and apparent commitment. However, the size and composition of troop contingents in these missions can be a misleading indicator of national commitment and the willingness to use force and take risks to implement the mission mandate. By extension, near-identical contingents, in terms of size, composition, and capability, may adopt completely contrasting approaches and exhibit different behaviours in the use of force and risk-assumption or aversion. What explains these varying commitments and approaches in the context of multinational peace enforcement operations?

This PhD project explores this puzzle and questions through a comparative case study based on two quintessential peace enforcement operations deployed during the post-Cold war period: The NATO Implementation/Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (NATO IFOR/SFOR) and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).